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Persons living with human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) have a disproportionately higher burden of human papillomavirus infection (HPV)-related cancers. Causal factors include both behavioral and biological. While pharmaceutical and care support interventions help address biological risk of coinfection, as social conditions are common drivers of behaviors, structural interventions are key part of behavioral interventions. Our objective is to develop a joint HIV-HPV model to evaluate the contribution of each factor, to subsequently inform intervention analyses. While compartmental modeling is sufficient for faster spreading HPV, network modeling is suitable for slower spreading HIV. However, using network modeling for jointly modeling HIV and HPV can generate computational complexities given their vastly varying disease epidemiology and disease burden across sub-population groups. We applied a recently developed mixed agent-based compartmental (MAC) simulation technique, which simulates persons with at least one slower spreading disease and their immediate contacts as agents in a network, and all other persons including those with faster spreading diseases in a compartmental model, with an evolving contact network algorithm maintaining the dynamics between the two models. We simulated HIV and HPV in the U.S. among heterosexual female, heterosexual male, and men who have sex with men (men only and men and women) (MSM), sub-populations that mix but have varying HIV burden, and cervical cancer among women. We conducted numerical analyses to evaluate the contribution of behavioral and biological factors to risk of cervical cancer among women with HIV. The model outputs for HIV, HPV, and cervical cancer compared well with surveillance estimates. Model estimates for relative prevalence of HPV (1.67 times) and relative incidence of cervical cancer (3.6 times), among women with HIV compared to women without, were also similar to that reported in observational studies in the literature. The fraction attributed to biological factors ranged from 22–38% for increased HPV prevalence and 80% for increased cervical cancer incidence, the remaining attributed to behavioral. The attribution of both behavioral and biological factors to increased HPV prevalence and cervical cancer incidence suggest the need for behavioral, structural, and pharmaceutical interventions. Validity of model results related to both individual and joint disease metrics serves as proof-of-concept of the MAC simulation technique. Understanding the contribution of behavioral and biological factors of risk helps inform interventions. Future work can expand the model to simulate sexual and care behaviors as functions of social conditions to jointly evaluate behavioral, structural, and pharmaceutical interventions for HIV and cervical cancer prevention.

 

We simulated epidemic projections of a potential COVID-19 outbreak in a residential university population in the United States under varying combinations of asymptomatic tests (5% to 33% per day), transmission rates (2.5% to 14%), and contact rates (1 to 25), to identify the contact rate threshold that, if exceeded, would lead to exponential growth in infections. Using this, we extracted contact rate thresholds among non-essential workers, population size thresholds in the absence of vaccines, and vaccine coverage thresholds. We further stream-lined our analyses to transmission rates of 5 to 8%, to correspond to the reported levels of face-mask-use/physical-distancing during the 2020 pandemic. Our results suggest that, in the absence of vaccines, testing alone without reducing population size would not be sufficient to control an outbreak. If the population size is lowered to 34% (or 44%) of the actual population size to maintain contact rates at 4 (or 7) among non-essential workers, mass tests at 25% (or 33%) per day would help control an outbreak. With the availability of vaccines, the campus can be kept at full population provided at least 95% are vaccinated. If vaccines are partially available such that the coverage is lower than 95%, keeping at full population would require asymptomatic testing, either mass tests at 25% per day if vaccine coverage is at 63–79%, or mass tests at 33% per day if vaccine coverage is at 53–68%. If vaccine coverage is below 53%, to control an outbreak, in addition to mass tests at 33% per day, it would also require lowering the population size to 90%, 75%, and 60%, if vaccine coverage is at 38–53%, 23–38%, and below 23%, respectively. Threshold estimates from this study, interpolated over the range of transmission rates, can collectively help inform campus level preparedness plans for adoption of face mask/physical-distancing, testing, remote instructions, and personnel scheduling, during non-availability or partial-availability of vaccines, in the event of SARS-Cov2-type disease outbreaks.